Land & Water Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 2

Article 12

1979

Indian Law - Jurisdiction - Closing the Door to Federal Court Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
Michael N. Deegan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Deegan, Michael N. (1979) "Indian Law - Jurisdiction - Closing the Door to Federal Court - Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 14 : Iss. 2 , pp. 625 - 634.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Deegan: Indian Law - Jurisdiction - Closing the Door to Federal Court - S
INDIAN LAW-JURISDICTION-"CLOSING THE DOOR TO FEDERAL COURT"
-Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US 49 1978.

Julia Martinez and her daughter Audrey sued the Santa
Clara Pueblo and its governor in federal district court' to
have parts of a tribal ordinance governing membership'
declared violative of the "equal protection" clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act,' and to enjoin defendants from enforcing it. Defendants resisted jurisdiction, contending that federal courts cannot take cognizance of intratribal controversies, particularly membership disputes. Plaintiffs asserted
that Section 1302(8) of the Act impliedly authorized a federal
cause of action to secure enforcement of civil rights under
Section 1343(4), Title 28 of the United States Code.5 Relying
Copyright ©1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975).
2. Id. at 6. Ordinance of 1939:
Be it ordained by the Council of the Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico. in
regular meeting duly assembled, that hereafter the following rules shall
govern the admission to membership to the Santa Clara Pueblo:
1 . ***
2. All children born of marriages between male members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo.
4. ***
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976) (originally enacted as act of April 11, 1968, P.L. 90-284, Title
II, § 202, 82 Stat. 77). [hereinafter referred to as "Act"]
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a cruminal proceeding the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of
six months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law;
(9) pass any bill or attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
4. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, supra note 1, at 7. See also Martinez v. Southern
Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976) (originally enacted as an amendment in Act of September
9, 1957, P.L. 85-315, Part III, § 121, 71 Stat. 637):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
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on precedent from other circuits,6 the district court took
jurisdiction under Section 1343(4). The court proceeded to
address the merits of the "equal protection" claim, and
ultimately granted plaintiffs the relief sought. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit agreed, without extended discussion, to
jurisdiction under Section 1343(4), but proceeded to reverse
the lower court on the merits.' On certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed on the issue of jurisdiction without reaching
the merits.8 Justice Marshall for the majority held that in
light of the legislative history of the Act, it was impossible
under the prevailing test to imply a federal cause of action
beyond the Act's explicit remedial provision of habeas corpus.'
THE LAW As IT WAS

Prior to passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act it was
generally settled law that a federal court did not have jurisdiction over the powers of self-government exercised by an
Indian tribe." While Congress, pursuant to its plenary
authority over the Indians," had periodically vested the
federal courts with jurisdiction over certain Indian activities,1 2 it had been the long-standing rule of the Supreme
Court that a federal statute would not be read as giving the
federal courts jurisdiction over Indian affairs unless there
was a clear expression of Congressional intent to that
effect.'" The only real challenge to this general proposition
came in a Ninth Circuit case which held that a tribe was a
federal instrumentality,' and so a federal court had jurisdic(1) *
(2) **

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

13.
14.

(3)
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including
the right to vote.
E.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968).
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 46 U.S.L.W. 4412 (U.S. May 15, 1978) (No. 76-682).
Id. at 4418.
See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); in commenting on the nature of olenary
congressional power over Indian affairs at 565: ". . . the power has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the
.overnment."
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1976) (originally enacted as the Indian Appropriation Act of
March 3, 1885, c. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362). This legislation gave the United States
jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed by one Indian against another in
and the said courts are hereby given jurisdiction in all such
Indian country: ...
cases.".."
See Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-2 (1883).
Corliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 378-9 (9th Cir. 1965).
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tion to hear a habeas corpus petition to test a tribal detention. But this logic, resting as it did on the premise that a
tribe was merely an arm of the federal sovereign, never prevailed beyond the limited fact situation of the case. The
weight of the law persisted in regarding Indians as members
of "distinct, independent political communities."' 5 Prior to
passage of the Act, and a major factor in provoking the
legislation, the Court had reiterated that the Constitution
did not govern tribal action,16 and thus there was no federal
jurisdiction over alleged constitutionally prohibited behavior practiced by a tribe in relation to its members.
The Act provided explicitly for one form of federal
review, that being habeas corpus.1" However, actions not involving the personal detention of the plaintiff soon flooded
the federal district courts. Lack of jurisdiction was consistently argued as a threshold bar to federal review.' 8 The
usual argument was that in providing for only one remedial
procedure in federal court for securing to an Indian his civil
liberties as a member of the tribe, the drafters of the Act had
foreclosed any other means of review, and that to imply a
cause of action from the legislation would be against established precedent." In spite of this argument the courts, if not
initially then on appeal, were unanimous in finding that they
had jurisdiction over claims brought under the Act.20 It was
felt that a general federal cause of action under the Act could
be implied,"' because it could not be supposed that Congress
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

21-

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir.
1959).
25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April 11, 1968, P.L. 90-284, Title
i, § 203, 82 Stat. 78).
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person,
in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order
of an Indian tribe.
Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157, 1159 (D.Wyo. 1970).
See Ex Parte Crow Dog, supra note 13.
A certain thicket in judicial thinking bears discussion at this point. There appears to
have been some confusion on the hart of the courts as to what exactly "jurisdiction"
meant. A number of cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction merely because the
plaintiff failed to state a claim. E.g., Slattery v.Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d
278, 281-2 (10th Cir. 1971). In fact, such action on the part of a court amounts to taking jurisdiction, since a dismissal for failure to state a claim is a decision on the
merits. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Other courts felt they had jurisdiction
in part because the Act was read as having waived the sovereign immunity of the
tribe. Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 202 (9th Cir. 1973).
Again the Bell lesson is missed. Sovereign immunity does not bar subject matter
jurisdiction; in fact it immunizes a party from the otherwise existing jurisdictional
reach of the court.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.13 (1968): cited for proposition
that an aDropriate remedy may be implied from legislative language declaratory of
rights, in order to carry out congressional purposes.
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would create such fundamental rights for the Indian without
intending that he have recourse to a federal forum to secure
those rights.22 The precise statutory basis for assuming
jurisdiction was alternatively felt to be Section 1331(a)
("federal question")" or Section 1343(4),24 although the lat-

ter provision quickly emerged as the favored authority.
None of the courts that considered the merits of an equal
protection claim under the Act were unmindful of Congress'
great concern that a certain degree of political and social
autonomy be reserved to the Indian tribes. The courts uniformly required an exhaustion of tribal remedies before
allowing a plaintiff to plead his case in a federal forum.25 In
ruling on the merits of a civil rights claim the trend was
decidedly in favor of developing analytic standards that
weighed heavily in favor of tribal custom instead of purely
reflecting the "bag and baggage" of federal case law developed on comparable points in the U.S. Constitution. 6
THE COURT'S REASONING

In addressing the jurisdictional issue raised by Martinez
the Court first observed that, in deference to notions of tribal sovereignty and plenary congressional authority over
Indian affairs, it would be loathe to imply a federal cause of
action under the Act in the absence of a clear indication of
legislative intent.27 With this caveat, the Court then applied
the prevailing test" for determining whether or not to imply
a cause of action from the language of a statute. In applying
22. E.g., Dodge v. Nakai, supra note 6, at 26.
23. E.g., Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 372 (D.N.M. 1971).
24. Supra note 5.
25. E.g., Charles O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.
1973): immediate review was available if delay would unnecessarily compound the
alleged deprivation of a civil right.
26. E.g., McCurdy v. Steel, 353 F. Supp. 629, 632-3 (D. Utah 1973).
27. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra note 8, at 4415.
28. Id. n.10. The test was comprehensively set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975):

First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose special benefit the statute
was enacted," (citation omitted)-that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? (citation omitted)
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? (citations omitted)
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state for
tribal] law, in an area basically the concern of the states [or tribes], so that
it would be inappropriate to infer,a cause of action based solely on federal
law?
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the test, the Court framed the dispositive point as whether
or not the implication of a federal cause of action under the
Act comported with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.2 9 The Court identified two equally important

goals which motivated passage of the Act: protection of the
individual Indian from arbitrary treatment by the tribe, and
the strengthening of the tribe itself in the cultural, political
and judicial sense." With these two goals in mind, the Court
examined the legislative history of the Act and concluded
that Congress' omission from the final legislative package of
a federal cause of action to secure rights enumerated under
the Act was deliberate.' In so concluding, the Court could
not agree with the lower courts that the rights bestowed by
the Act were thus rendered unenforceable, for it asserted
that the tribal courts 2 themselves were well-equipped to adjudicate claims under the Act, and that preference for this
forum served the congressional aim of strengthening tribal
institutions."
ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's reasoning on the jurisdictional
issue is refreshingly clear and so compelling as to raise
critical questions about the propriety of the lower federal
courts in assuming jurisdiction over claims brought by individual Indians under the Indian Civil Rights Act. In assuming jurisdiction, the lower federal courts were remiss in two
respects: first, they did not carefully examine the legislative
history of the Act in order to conclude whether a federal
cause of action ought to be inferred; and, second, they gave
inordinate weight to the congressional goal of securing civil
rights to individual Indians at the expense of giving deserved consideration to the equally prominent congressional
29. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra note 8, at 4415.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Note: While the term "tribal court" is a term of art among Indian law experts, it is
used throughout this case note in its generic sense. Technically, there are thought to
be three different types of Indian court systems: a Court of Indian Offenses is structured according to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior; a
Traditional Court is a tribal judicial system operating as it did in pre-Columbian
times; a Tribal Court is a court of Indian design as distinguished from being modelled after Department of Interior recommendations, but it is of recent vintage compared with a Traditional Court, and is not regarded as a primeaval tribal judicial
system.
33. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra note 8, at 4416.
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wish to see the tribes thrive as functioning political-judicial
units.
Briefly, the legislative history of the Act reveals early
proposals for broad federal review of both civil and criminal
disputes arising under the Act, giving way later to a limited
federal review of claims arising in the criminal context only.
Subsequent to exploratory hearings on the constitutional
rights of American Indians which commenced in 1961 under
the direction of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and which
lasted nearly three years, 4 Senator Sam Ervin introduced
legislation in the first session of the 89th Congress which included two provisions of especial interest: S.96211 provided
for de novo review in federal court of any criminal conviction
before a tribal court wherein it was alleged that an individual
had been deprived of any constitutional right secured to him
by S.961;36 S.963 3

would have permitted the Attorney

General to institute actions in federal court to redress tribal
deprivations of civil rights in either the civil or criminal context. This latter proposal was the only one which would have
allowed for federal review of intratribal civil disputes. As
reported out of committee, S.963 was dropped altogether because of strong opposition by the tribes.3 8 Aside from this
34. Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess. (1961-1962), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). [Hereinafter referred to as
"1961 Hearings"]
35. S.962. 89th Cong., Ist Sess.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) in any criminal action
hereafter commenced in an Indian court against any individual wherein an
individual is convicted by the court and deprived of a constitutional right,
he shall have a right of appeal to the United States district court for the
district and division embracing the place wherein such individual was
prosecuted.
(b) Upon the filing of the notice of appeal with the clerk of the United
States district court, the appeal shall be placed on the trial docket for trial
de novo in the United States district court, '*
36. S.961, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congressassembled, That any Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local self-government shall be subject to the same limitations and restraints as those which are imposed on the Government of the
United States by the United States Constitution.
37. S.963. 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assemblea, That the Attorney General is
authorized and directed to receive and investigate any written complaint
filed with him by any Indian or by any person or agency acting in behalf of
any Indian alleging that such Indian has been deprived of a right conferred upon citizens of the United States by the laws and Constitution of
the United States. If, on the basis of such investigation, he determines
that such Indian has been deprived of any such constitutional right, the
Attorney General shall bring such criminal or other action as he deems appropriate to vindicate and secure such right to such Indian.
38. Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
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brief flirtation with S.963 and entertainment of a substitute
offered by the Department of the Interior, 9 the legislative
history of the Act is without any discussion devoted to the
idea of federal review of civil disputes that might arise. Insofar as the hearings dealt with tribal disparagement of individual rights, 40 it was almost exclusively within the pro-

vince of criminal procedure. And in spite of Congress' grave
concern with deprivation of civil rights in criminal cases, the
broad federal review originally contemplated by S.962 itself
ultimately emerged in final enactment as a simple habeas
corpus provision.4 So a careful scrutiny of the legislative
genesis of the Act impeaches a cavalier assumption of jurisdiction of the sort that was prevalent in the lower federal
judiciary prior to the Martinez case, and squarely supports
the Supreme Court's reasoning.
The lower federal courts also uniformly failed to consider the subtle distinction raised by the Supreme Court that
"providing a federal forum for issues arising under Section
1302 constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and
self-government beyond that created by the change in substantive law itself.

'4

In its evaluation of the impact of the

Act the Court perceived the interest of the tribe itself in relation to two distinguishable aspects of the legislation: reme-

39.

40.
41.

42.

Summary Report of Hearings and Investigations: Constitutional Rights of the
American Indian, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1966); the comments at 15 of one witness
with reference to S.963:
This [bill] would in effect subject the tribal sovereignty of self-government
to the federal government .... This bill by its broad terms, would allow the
Attorney General to bring any kind of action as he deems appropriate. By
this bill, any time a member of a tribe would not be satisfied with an action
by the council, it would allow them to file a complaint with the Attorney
General and subject the tribe to a multitude of investigations and threat
of court action.
Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings on S.961-968 and S.J. Res.
40 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 317-18 (1965): the proposed Interior Department
substitute in effect would have set up the Department as a screening agent between
an aggrieved Indian and the federal district court. The Acting Secretary of the Interior described the proposal thusly:
In addition, the bill gives the American Indian a right to appeal to the
Secretary of the Interior in civil and criminal actions taken by the tribal
government which result in an infringement of the Indian's rights
guaranteed by this bill. In the case of criminal proceedings, as weU as
other actions, including civil actions, the bill gives a right to appeal a decision of the Secretary to federal district courts.
Two other broad areas of congressional inquiry were entitlement to federal benefits and
the emotion-laden question of deprivation of Constitutional rights at the hands of
state authorities.
S.962 as reported out of committee (supranote 37) was reintroduced as S.1843 in the
first session of the 90th Congress. As reintroduced, the de novo review provision of the
original S.962 was supplemented with a habeas corpus provision. As reported out of
committee and as ultimately passed, only the habeas corpus provision survived.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra note 8,at 4415.
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dial and substantive. While the tribal courts were bound by
the Act to protect individual rights, they were to be protected from disintegrative federal case law by being the sole adjudicators of those rights. In contrast, the lower federal
courts in assuming jurisdiction under the Act regarded the
rights secured therein as unenforceable if separated from the
benefit of federal protection.43 Following from this faulty
premise, the conclusion that Congress silently authorized a
federal cause of action is not so surprising. The flaw in
reasoning by the lower courts was in failing to emphasize the
imperative of tribal autonomy to the same extent that they
emphasized the need to vindicate individual rights, and in
failing to appreciate the direct interference with tribal policy
choices that resulted in their ruling on civil rights claims.
The Court's ruling is a radical departure from the settled
case law in the area. That the Court has made a policy statement of great import is evident from the fact that it needn't
have gone as far as it did. The Court could have reversed on
the merits, with a reprimand to the court of appeal for not
applying an equal protection standard deferential enough to
Indian tribal autonomy. The Court could have pronounced
what that standard was to be, in clear terms, for the future
guidance of the lower federal judiciary. Instead, the Court
took a "meat cleaver" approach to the threshold jurisdictional issue that the lower courts had become used to hurdling with ease.
All manner of claims under the Act are now off-limits to
the federal courts. Typical of claims that are now to be resolved in the tribal courts, if at all, is the validity under the
4
Act's equal protection clause of enrollment requirements
and residency requirements for candidates for public office,43
and the validity under the Act's due process clause of a
tribe's consideration of a liquor license application. 46 The
Supreme Court has endorsed the competency of tribal courts
to safeguard Section 1302 rights.4 1 But as a practical matter
it is unlikely that this will happen in the context of civil
43. Loncassion v. Leekity, supra note 23, at 372-3.
44. E.g., Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, supra note 1.
45. E.g., Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 529 F.2d 233
(9th Cir. 1976).

46. E.g., Berry v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934 (D. Wyo. 1976).
47. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra note 8, at 4416.
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disputes where federal review is no longer available. Particularly litigious areas would involve questions of due process
with regard to the taking of property, and of course the Act's
equal protection clause. The reason why civil rights of this
nature will seldom be vindicated is that there is little distinction in fact in most tribes between the legislative, executive
8

and judicial functions.4

The Pueblos of New Mexico offer an example of a tribal
system wherein all power emanates from one source, the caciques or holy men. "Their ability stands out and it shows9
them off and, naturally, they are recognized as leaders."'
These elders select the council members who promulgate
policy, and who sit as judge and jury in judicial matters."
Although other tribes may appear to have delineated these
political tasks, the usual pervasive influence of a tribal council in selecting executive and judicial officers works against a
conclusion of tripartite government as non-Indian Americans understand that term. As a result, where the executive
branch of a tribe resists a claim under the Act it is unlikely
that its wishes will be contradicted by the tribal court. Even
if a tribal court were to choose to independently review a
claim under the Act, while it is bound by substantive provisions there is no body of case law it must follow other than
that which it cares to promulgate.
The full effect of the Martinez decision is not likely to be
felt for a number of years to come, as the tribes begin to
develop economically, and to interface with the non-Indian
community on a more sophisticated level. As a general proposition, to the extent that individual Indians share the collective bearing of the tribe they would not be expected to
challenge tribal practices for the obvious reason that they
would tend to not regard them as invidious. But the Act protects "persons" from tribal action, 51 not just Indians in par48.

49.
50.
51.

1961 Hearings, supranote 33, at 165 (statement of Homer B. Jenkins, Chief, Branch
of Tribal Programs, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior):
In some instances there is actually little separation of power. Usually
power is completely vested in a tribal council. The notion of executive
authority or judicial responsibility apart from legislative authority has
not yet fully emerged.
Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1969) (statement of Domingo Montoya, Zia Pueblo).
Id. at 12-15.
Act, supra note 3.
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ticular. As the tribes build up more complex regulatory infrastructures, affecting Indians and non-Indians alike, the
likelihood that a non-Indian will perceive one of his individual rights to have been abridged by some tribal practice
will increase.
Courts have already held that incident to their retained
tribal sovereignty the tribes possess broad authority to tax
activity within the reservation,5 2 regulate economic development and land use within the reservation," and otherwise
govern the behavior of outsiders who come on the reservation.54 In exercising these broad sovereign functions, the
tribes will undoubtedly infringe upon Anglo sensitivities to
civil rights in ways that would not be felt by Indians. It is
when actions under the Act are increasingly brought by nonIndians before the tribal forum that the true import of the
Martinez decision will be felt. For in these cases the constituency of the tribal court will have extended beyond tribal
ethnocentrism. Called upon to mete out justice to nonIndians, the competency of the tribal courts to safeguard
Section 1302 rights will be fairly tested.
CONCLUSION

For now, however, the Martinez case stands as an expression of judicial faith in the capabilities of the tribe to
govern itself and those few outsiders that come within its
sovereign prerogative. The Court has once again acted out
its historic role as guarantor of tribal sovereignty, this time
as against the pretensions of its own judicial family.
MICHAEL

52.
53.
54.

N. DEEGAN

Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975).
Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
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